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Abstract: The ‘institutional’ affairs that unfolded between the early and 
late Middle Ages can be (and have been) reconstructed in varying degrees 
of detail through diplomas, documents and chronicles. Regarding Italy, 
there is also another source that up to now has been rather ignored, and 
which might offer some insight into the more strictly legal aspects of these 
events. Specifically, I am referring to eleventh-century Italian jurisprudence 
on political crimes. Indeed, legal stances on the repression of dissent, on 
the justification of resistance to authority and on making peace between 
‘private’ parties can be found in the Expositio to the Liber Papiensis, in the 
legal formulary and in some glosses appearing in manuscripts which were 
still in use in the 1130s. 
These sources shed light on the expression and organization of political 
struggle in the Kingdom of Italy – be it through rebellion, protest or 
association – and on how that was perceived by the legitimate authorities. 
By studying them, it is possible to analyze how the concept of justice and 
institutions evolved from the early Middle Ages to the communal period. 
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Summary: 1. Society and law at the birth of the commune – 2. 
Justification, reconciliation, exile: Political dissent in the early Middle Ages 
a) Peacemaking between private parties, b) Causae publicae: Rebellion 
(seditio) without the king’s authorization c) Protests against ‘just’ rulings 
issued by public authorities, d) Adunationes, collectae and cospirationes of 
private individuals and holders of public office: Punishment by exile – 3. 
The interpretation of rules on rebellions and political associations in the 
expositio and glossae to the Liber papiensis (11th-12th centuries), a) 
Negligence on the part of the authorities: Strict interpretation of 
justification for rebellion, b) Negligence on the part of the authorities: 
Extending justification to sworn unions – 4. Conclusions 
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1. Society and law at the birth of the commune 
The development of the Italian city commune has never ceased to pique 
the interest of historians. Indeed, it forged a novel relationship between 
rulers and subjects, and as such was probably the most revolutionary and 
fruitful innovation of medieval law in the evolution of public law1.  
Chronicles dating back to the tenth century speak of coniurationes of 
citizens against the empire2, and there is also historiographical evidence of 
how, in many cases, the political and institutional changes that took place 
in the cities of northern and central Italy were led by citizens who had 
formed sworn associations (even in the Dark Ages, these cities had 
remained hubs of public authority 3 ). Furthermore, there is general 
consensus that these types of associations were formed so that local 
citizens could reclaim control over powers and functions that at the time 
were exercised by the empire’s representatives. 
In a phase that predated the actual formation of the commune, such 
associations were essentially organizations founded upon a negotiated 
agreement among their members. They were potentially subversive in 
 
1 The idea for this article first took shape during the presentation of a report entitled 
Figure del nemico nel diritto medievale, delivered at the American Academy in Rome on 9 
April 2014 during a seminar on the topic of Dispute, Violence and Peace-making Practices 
in Medieval Italy (New Work in the Humanities Series 2013-2014). 
2 On these and previous chronicles, see: G. Dilcher, Die Entstehung der lombardischen 
Stadtcommune, Eine rechtsgeschichtliche Untersuchung, Aalen, 1967, pp. 142 et seq.; Id., 
Coniuratio and Eid, in Lexicon des Mittelalters, München, Zürich, Artemis Verlag, 1986, vol. 
3, pp. 136-137 and 1673-1692; Id., Hell. Verständig, für die Gegenwart sorgend, die 
Zukunft Bedenkend, zur Stellung und Rolle der mitelalterlichen deutchen Stadtrechten, 
«ZSS GA» 106(1989), pp. 12-45, Italian translation in «Nuova rivista Storica» 74(1990), pp. 
489-514; A. Padoa Schioppa, Il diritto nella storia d’Europa, p. I, Il medioevo, Padova, 1995, 
pp. 200-205; P. Prodi, Il sacramento del potere. Il giuramento politico nella storia 
costituzionale, Bologna, 1992, pp. 113-115. 
3 G. Sergi, Le città come luoghi di continuità di nozioni pubbliche del potere. Le aree 
delle Marche di Ivrea e di Torino, in Piemonte medievale. Forme del potere e della società. 
Per Giovanni Tabacco, Torino, Einaudi, 1985, pp.5-27; Id. Interferenze tra città e campagna 
nei capitolari, in Città e campagna nei secoli alto medievali, Spoleto, 2009 (Settimane 
CISAM, LVI), pp. 245-263; Ch. Wickham, Framing the early middle ages 400-800. Europe 
and the Mediterranean 400-800, Oxford, 2005, pp. 592-594 and with a specific focus on 
Italy, pp. 605-606 and 645-656. 
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nature, as they represented an expression of dissent and disobedience to 
the legitimate authorities. These groups of citizens were characterized by 
the swearing of an oath (to be repeated regularly), as well as by their claim 
to pursue general interests that were different than those championed by 
the bishops or, in some cases, the counts4. Various forms of organized 
political dissent can also be found in records from the early twelfth 
century. It appears that most of these associations were founded upon a 
mutual oath taken by members and by those elected to exercise 
governmental and judicial functions in the exclusive interest of those 
members (it should be noted that in later times, not all citizens of a given 
city necessarily became members of such associations). Such was the case 
for the Genoese compagna, as recorded in briefs dating to the twelfth 
century (1143 and 1157)5, as well as Pisa in 11626: 
 
Eorum autem reclamationes qui sacramentum consulatui non fecerint, 
inquisiti, nisi a me vel ab aliquo de sociis meis consulibus remissum fuerit, 
mea sint voluntate.7. 
 
By swearing an oath of loyalty (generally called juramentum 
 
4 P. Michaud Quantin, Universitas expression du mouvement communautaire dans le 
Moyen-Âge, Paris, 1970, pp. 233-234, and on the repetition of the oath, see Dilcher, Die 
Entstehung (nt. 2), p. 190; C. Storti Storchi, Diritto e istituzioni a Bergamo dal comune alla 
signoria, Milano, 1984, especially pp. 181-204. 
5 On the elite nature of the first Genoese compagna, I shall limit myself to citing the 
following works: V. Piergiovanni, Brevi considerazioni sulla compagna e sul comune 
genovese, in Id., Gli statuti civili e criminali di Genova. La tradizione manoscritta e le 
edizioni, Genova, 1980, pp. 247-252; Id., Le istituzioni politiche: dalla compagna al podestà 
now in Id., Norme, scienza e pratica giuridica tra Genova e l’Occidente medievale e 
moderno, Genova, 2012, vol. I, pp. 225-338. 
6 Breve consulum Pisanae civitatis anno MCLXII, in I brevi dei consoli del comune di Pisa 
degli anni 1162-1164, O. Banti (ed.), Roma, 1997, § 20, p. 57. The treatment of foreigners 
was based on these premises. 
7 U. Santarelli, La normativa statutaria nel quadro dell’esperienza giuridica 
bassomedievale, in Id., Ubi societas ibi ius, 
A. Landi (ed.), Torino, 2010, pp. 793-806, especially pp. 797-798; A. Padoa Schioppa, 
Diritto e istituzioni nell’età comunale, in Id., Italia ed Europa nella storia del diritto, 
Bologna, 2005, pp. 83-84.  
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sequimenti), members, in the name of peace and justice, undertook to 
obey the consuls in the pursuit of mutual interests. In turn, the consuls 
pledged to enforce the rules governing the exercise of their functions, as 
agreed upon with members prior to their election, or in accordance with 
subsequent proposals approved by members in an assembly. Furthermore, 
as I mentioned above, it was always in the exclusive interest of association 
members. 
From an economic, social and cultural point of view, the last quarter of 
the eleventh century was characterized by an «increase in wealth», «social 
mobility» and a «new intensity in the circulation of people, goods and 
ideas»8. Such circumstances set the stage for the emancipation of new 
social classes, allowing them to seize political power by forming 
communes. Moreover, this new legal system was set up by and for its 
members so that it could oppose the established authorities and ‘freely’ 
achieve what members considered the ‘true’ utilitas of citizens. 
Pietro Costa examined how the terms ‘liberty’ and ‘autonomy’ were 
seen as fundamental aspects of these new communes. In particular, he 
took a century-by-century look at how, in theory and in practice, public law 
interpreted the nature and prerogatives of the commune9. In terms of the 
relationship between rulers and subjects, libertas was the dominant term 
in sources dating from the transition period between the early and late 
Middle Ages, with some mentions dating back to as early as the tenth 
century. Specifically, it was used with regard to the freedom to exercise 
certain powers that fell under the public sphere10, such as the right to 
 
8 P. Cammarosano, Storia dell’Italia medievale dal VI all’XI secolo, Bari, 2001, p. 389. 
9 P. Costa, Così lontano così vicino, il comune medievale e la sua autonomia, «Quaderni 
fiorentini» (= QF) 42(2014) Autonomia. Unità e pluralità nel sapere giuridico fra Otto e 
Novecento, pp. 689-782. 
10 G. Fasoli, Le autonomie cittadine nel medioevo, in Nuove questione di storia 
medievale, Milano, 1964, pp. 145-176, especially 153; E. Sestan, La città comunale italiana 
dei secoli XI-XIII nelle sue note caratteristiche rispetto al movimento comunale europeo, in 
Forme di potere e struttura sociale in Italia nel Medioevo, G. Rossetti (ed.), Bologna, 1977, 
pp. 177-195; E. Artifoni, Tensioni sociali e istituzioni nel mondo comunale, in La storia, N. 
Tranfaglia, M. Firpo (ed.), Torino, 1986, pp. 461-491, especially pp. 483-487; R. Bordone, 
La società cittadina del Regno d’Italia: formazione e sviluppo delle caratteristiche urbane 
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trade and the right to use state property11. Indeed, up until at least the 
third decade of the twelfth century, the term commune was primarily used 
as an adjective or adverb to describe the people as a whole or mutual 
goods or interests – a long process was still to unfold before it would come 
to indicate a new legal system12. Only between the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries would the concept and practice of libertas expand to include the 
exercise of governmental, legislative and judicial functions on a local 
level13. 
However, such a notion of liberty did not exclude deference to a 
superior authority. For example, if it meant achieving their freedom, 
citizens might have even been willing to recognize the superiority of a 
sovereign if he could protect them from the tyranny of their ruler. Indeed, 
such cases represented nothing short of ‘intervention by invitation’, which 
legal doctrine would eventually fully recognize under ius inter gentes in 
early modern law14. Milan was an example of a city that took such a route 
almost two centuries after what might have been the first rebellion 
(coniuratio) against their bishop in 97615. Indeed, in order to defend 
 
nei secoli XI-XII, Torino, 1987; Cammarosano, Storia dell’Italia medievale (nt.8), pp. 297 et 
seq.; Padoa Schioppa, Il diritto nella storia d’Europa [nt. 2], pp. 197-199 and M. Ascheri, La 
città - stato, Bologna, il Mulino, 2006, pp. 27-30.  
11 A famous case is that of the securitas, or reconciliation, that was reached in 
Cremona in 996 between the local community (guilty of «conspiracy») and Emperor Otto 
III, which ended up granting citizens the use of property pertinentes ad rem publicam 
(Ottonis III Diplomata, T. Sickel (ed.), in Monumenta Germaniae Historica (= MGH), 
Diplomata 2.2, reprinted in München, 1980, nr. 198, Sp. 606-607), recently examined in E. 
Coleman, Origins of the Commune of Cremona, Three Texts translated from Latin (996-
1097) in Medieval Italy. Texts in Translation, K. L. Jansen, J. Drell, F. Andrews (ed.), 
Philadelphia, 2011, pp. 52-53. 
12 O. Banti, «Civitas» e «commune» nelle fonti italiane dei secoli XI e XII, in Forme di 
potere e struttura sociale in Italia (nt. 10), pp. 217-239, especially pp. 221-232. 
13  On the essentially political nature of communal libertas, see M. Sbriccoli, 
L’interpretazione dello statuto. Contributo allo studio della funzione del giurista in età 
comunale, Milano, 1969, p. 18.  
14 For example, see A. Gentili, Il diritto di guerra (De iure belli libri III. 1598), Milano, A. 
Giuffré Editore, 2008 (Centro Internazionale di Studi Gentiliani), Lib. I, cap. XVI, Della 
difesa dei sudditi altrui contro il loro signore, pp. 108-114. 
15 Ascheri, La città – stato (nt. 10), p. 35; E. Besta (G. Vismara), L’età ottoniana, in 
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themselves from Frederick Barbarossa, who had destroyed the city in 1162, 
it appears that the Milanese had not only opened up negotiations with the 
Byzantine emperor Manuel I Comnenus16, but also with King Henry II of 
England17. The Milanese offered to recognize the sovereignty of these 
rulers in exchange for protection from the ‘tyrannical’ rule of Barbarossa, 
in order that they could preserve their libertas. That very same liberty had 
actually been granted by the empire as a privilege to Pisa and Genoa in 
1162, just a few months apart18. In any case, there is no doubt that the 
concept and reality of sovereignty and ‘liberty’ had changed, what with so 
many years having passed since the first expressions of dissent in Europe. 
Though it was a sporadic and tortuous process that played out over the 
course of almost two centuries, with periods of progress and stagnation 
mixed in with a fair share of defeats, citizens in various regions of Europe 
were able to gain more and more control of powers that were once 
considered prerogatives of the public authority. At times they even 
managed to do so through peaceful means, with the kingdom or empire 
 
Storia di Milano, vol. II, Dall’invasione dei barbari all’apogeo del governo vescovile (493-
1002), Fondazione Treccani degli Alfieri, 1954, pp. 484-485.  
16 On Odofredus’ account: G. L. Barni, La lotta contro il Barbarossa, in Storia di Milano 
(nt. 15), vol. IV, Dalle lotte contro il Barbarossa al primo signore (1152-1310), p. 62. 
17 G. Raccagni, English views on Lombard City Communes and their Conflicts with 
Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, «Quaderni Storici», 145(2014), pp. 183-218 and in 
http://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/english-views-on-lombard-city-
communes-and-their-conflicts-with-emperor-frederick-i-barbarossa(86e186ec-abd0-4f03-
a151-82747eefb231).html, p. 11. 
18  The privileges were granted in the form of treaties, in MGH, Legum s. IV 
Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, t. I, Hannoverae, 1910 (reprinted in 
1963), nr. 205 Conventio cum Pisanis, 1162, April 6, 4: «Et ut Pisani […] sint liberi, etiam 
sub consulatu et iurisdictionis et potestatibus de se ipsius libere sicut eis placuerit», p. 
283; nr. 211 Conventio cum Ianuensibus, June 9, 4: Item donamus et concedimus in 
feudum consulibus et communi Ianuam liberam potestatem eligendi ex se ipsis, firmandi 
et habendi consules et eis utendi, qui habeant ius et facultatem liberam faciendi iustitiam 
et puniendi maleficia in civitae et districtu suo bona fide, legibus et secundum bonos 
mores istius civitatis […». C. Storti Storchi, Intorno ai Costituti pisani della legge e dell’uso 
(secolo XII), Napoli, 1998, pp. 56-68; Ead., Per un'indagine sui costituti pisani. Alle origini 
del ius proprium tra continuità e rinnovamento, in A Ennio Cortese, Roma, 2001, pp. 387-
400, especially pp. 399-400. 
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granting them privileges that simply confirmed their right to exercise 
functions which had already been taken over by citizens. As for the cities in 
the Kingdom of Italy, they benefited from the ‘good fortune’ of a so-called 
‘incomplete’ political authority 19 , combined with the weakness and 
discontinuity of sovereign institutions, such that in some cases they were 
able to slowly take over the exercise of public functions in novel ways that 
distinguished them from other European cities20. In other situations and 
periods, this occurred by subverting those in power, who were decried as 
unjust or ‘tyrannical’. Such conflicts resulted in outright rebellions and 
internal struggles, not only in northern Italy 21  but also in France, 
Germany22 and England in the first years of the Norman conquest23. 
Furthermore, it was in these very situations that the chronicles were more 
likely to use the term coniuratio/coniurationes. 
Of course, the ‘institutional’ affairs that unfolded between the early and 
late Middle Ages can be (and have been) reconstructed in varying degrees 
of detail through diplomas, documents and chronicles. Regarding Italy, 
however, there is also another source that up to now has been rather 
ignored, and which might offer some insight into the more strictly legal 
aspects of these events. Specifically, I am referring to eleventh-century 
Italian jurisprudence on political crimes. Indeed, legal stances on the 
repression of dissent, on the justification of resistance to authority and on 
making peace between ‘private’ parties can be found in the Expositio to 
the Liber Papiensis, in the legal formulary and in some glosses appearing in 
 
19 P. Grossi, L’ordine giuridico medievale. Dieci anni dopo, Bari, 2006, pp. 41-49. 
20 Sestan, La città comunale italiana (nt. 10), p. 187; Cammarosano, Storia dell’Italia 
medievale (nt.8), pp. 212- 223; Padoa Schioppa, Il diritto nella storia d’Europa (nt. 2), pp. 
202-206. 
21 Costa, Così lontano (nt. 9), pp. 759-766. 
22 Padoa Schioppa, Il diritto nella storia d’Europa (nt. 2), pp. 199-201. 
23 Orderici Vitalis angligenae Historia ecclesiastica, in Patrologiae cursus completus vol. 
188, Parisii, apud J. P. Migne editorem, 1855, coll. 17-984, for example coll. 310 («pro 
amissa libertate»), 312 («pro vindicanda libertate»), which can also be found in the English 
translation The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, 6 vol., Oxford Medieval Texts, 1968-
1980, translated by M. Chibnall; for an analysis of the work: Id., The world of Olderic 
Vitalis, Oxford, 1984. Specifically, see: Raccagni, English views on Lombard City (nt. 17), p. 
15. 
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manuscripts which were still in use in the 1130s. 
These sources shed light on the expression and organization of political 
struggle in the Kingdom of Italy – be it through rebellion, protest or 
association – and on how that was perceived by the legitimate authorities. 
By studying them, it is possible to analyze how the concept of justice24 and 
institutions evolved from the early Middle Ages to the communal period. 
It is a long process that requires an analysis of Lombard and Carolingian 
laws on dissent. Though it had long become clear that these laws ran 
against the leges romanae, they were nonetheless subjected to methodical 
interpretation on the part of the judges in Pavia centuries later – surprising 
given that Roman law was progressively establishing itself in many other 
spheres25. 
 
2. Justification, reconciliation, exile: Political dissent in the early Middle 
Ages 
The relationship between rulers and subjects was interpreted differently 
by the Lombard and Carolingian empires, giving rise to three principles that 
would play a key role in the law’s approach to maintaining public order and 
dealing with political dissent over the course of the eleventh century: 
firstly, it was deemed lawful to protest against unjust acts committed by 
the authorities, though the authorities determined the ways in which such 
dissent could be expressed 26 ; secondly, anyone who had peacefully 
protested against just orders or rulings issued by the authorities would be 
punished by exile; and lastly, the practice of making peace between private 
 
24  L. Loschiavo, La risoluzione dei conflitti in età altomedievale: un excursus 
storiografico, in Il diritto per la storia. Gli studi storico giuridici nella ricerca medievistica, E. 
Conte, M. Miglio (ed.), Roma, Istituto storico per il Medio Evo, 2010, pp. 91-111; La 
giustizia nell’alto medioevo (Secoli V-VIII), Spoleto, 1995 (Settimane CISAM, XLII); La 
giustizia nell’alto medioevo (Secoli IX-XI), Spoleto, 1997 (Settimane CISAM, XLIV); A. Padoa 
Schioppa, Note sulla giustizia medievale nella ricerca storico-giuridica, in Storia della 
giustizia e storia del diritto, prospettive europee di ricerca, L. Lacché, M. Meccarelli (ed.), 
Macerata, 2012, pp. 101-113, now in Id., Giustizia medievale italiana. Dal Regno ai 
Comuni, Spoleto, 2015, pp. 293-113. 
25 See note 84 below. 
26 See § 3 below. 
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parties was to be safeguarded. In the first two cases, subjects were 
obedient only to the extent that the rulers’ actions were just; the last case 
focused on safeguarding peace in society (or in the kingdom), as well as 
ensuring that subjects respected the obligations to which they were bound 
through formal acts of reconciliation negotiated by local authorities. We 
might say that punishment by exile for those on the losing end of a political 
struggle and the safeguarding of peacemaking practices between private 
parties were legacies of the past27, or in the words of Antonio Padoa 
Schioppa, examples of the «spolia» used to build the «new structure» that 
was the commune28. 
Italy in the early Middle Ages was a multiethnic society which, like other 
European territories, was beset by wars in order to expand or defend its 
domain. In this context, the more control the kingdom exercised over 
society, the more it sought consensus from its subjects29. In many ways, 
political and judicial authorities at every level of the hierarchy represented 
a potential threat to the relationship between the central government and 
its peripheral cities. If they were to deny justice, or appoint the wrong 
judge to handle a certain case, then they might be accused of being biased 
or of colluding with a higher authority – such worries continued into the 
twelfth century, as clearly expressed by Frederick Barbarossa30. In order to 
avoid these risks, members of society were involved in public hearings 
known as placita. These occasions provided a forum for the ‘laity’31 to 
voice their opinions on judicial matters, and the government paid 
 
27 P. Costa review of P. P. Portinaro, Il labirinto delle istituzioni nella storia europea, 
Bologna, 2007, «QF» 37(2008), pp. 598-603. 
28 Padoa Schioppa, Il diritto nella storia d’Europa (nt. 2), p. 211. 
29 Obviously, the term ‘multiethnic’ warrants clarification; for more on this, in addition 
to references to the historiographical debate, see C. Storti, Le dimensioni giuridiche della 
curtis regia longobarda, in Le corti nell’alto medioevo, t. I, Spoleto, 2014 (Settimane 
CISAM, LXII), pp. 429-472, especially pp. 444-450; Ead., Ascertainment of customs and 
national and/or personal laws in medieval Italy from the Lombard Kingdom to the 
Communes, in «Rechtsgeschichte Legal History», 24(2016), pp. 257-265 especially pp. 257-
258. 
30 MGH, Legum s. IV Constitutiones t. I (nt. 18), nr. 176. Constitutio pacis, 5, p. 246. 
31 Padoa Schioppa, Giustizia medievale italiana (nt. 24), especially pp. 1-253, 287-299. 
CLAUDIA STORTI 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 2 (2017), n. 01, pag. 1-31.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 10 
particular attention to any negative reactions on the part of the public, not 
only as regarded rulings, but also for what concerned any acts or orders 
issued by the king’s delegates that the public considered illegal or unfair32.  
Under Liutprand and Ratchis, Lombard legislation classified 
disobedience, protest and rebellion against the authorities as distinct types 
of crime. Lothar cracked down on different forms of political dissent even 
further in the Carolingian era, punishing even the simple act of forming an 
organized political association through rituals such as the swearing of an 
oath or shaking right hands. However, the severity of such measures to 
repress political dissent was offset by Carolingian legislation, which 
provided for different types of justification in certain cases. Thus, 
punishments were inflicted only after verifying whether there had been a 
legitimate reason behind such ‘resistance’33. 
In this way, lawmakers aimed to accomplish two goals. On the one 
hand, they sought to fight against political dissent, which was viewed as a 
crime of public relevance due to the fact that it disturbed the peace and 
public order in general; thus, jurisdictional authority was centralized, so 
that cases which had previously been left to negotiation between the 
parties or to rulings issued by decentralized curtes now fell under the 
authority of the palatium. On the other hand, they were making an effort 
to improve the central government’s standing in the eyes of its subjects; 
thus, they intensified control over those who had been delegated by the 
king to exercise judicial and executive authority, and they provided 
dissident subjects who ‘justifiably’ opposed the decentralized authorities 
with direct – albeit progressively restricted – access to the king. 
 
a) Peacemaking between private parties 
The reconciliation of parties in conflict (discordia) was considered an act 
that benefited the public interest, and as such fell under causae regales. In 
 
32 For more on this, including a bibliography, see C. Storti, Città e campagna nello 
specchio della giustizia altomedievale, in Città e campagna (nt. 3), pp. 294-336, especially 
pp. 299-302. 
33 F. Graus, La concezione medievale del potere e del diritto, «Studi storici», 50,2(2009), 
pp. 395-411.  
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order to prevent disputes or avoid further conflict, local authorities (iudex 
aut actor publicus) sought to encourage the negotiation of an agreement 
(treuva). Any breach of the latter would result in a monetary sanction 
(compositio), to be paid in equal parts to the publicum and the injured 
party. While the compositio was determined on a case-by-case basis, 
Liutprand believed that it should be a considerable amount of money, so as 
to discourage parties from breaching the agreement: 
 
Si quis iudex aut actor puplicus in qualicumque civitate aut loco inter 
homenis qui aliquam discordiam habent, treuvas tulerit, et unus ex ipis 
hominibus inter quos ipsa truvas tulta sunt, eas ruperit […] 34. 
 
The regulation of peacemaking practices between ‘private’ parties 
remained practically unchanged for almost three centuries, as 
demonstrated by the expositio as well as by records dating back to the 
Carolingian era35. However, judges had to reckon with those who, drawing 
on Roman law, claimed that they were not held to any obligation 
whatsoever if a judge had negotiated a truce in their absence and/or in the 
absence of the counterparty (according to Roman law, any agreements 
reached between absent parties was declared null and void) 36. Thus, the 
anonymous expositor suggested taking precautionary measures to avoid 
such problems. Specifically, the arbitrator was to ask each litigant, 
singillatim, to waive any such claim and to accept the imposition of any 
penalty. This recalls the twelfth-century practice of inserting clauses in 
peacemaking agreements in which the parties undertook not to breach the 
agreement by resorting to technicalities in its interpretation, and to avoid 
 
34 Liutp. 42 a. 723. 
35 Exp. ad Liut. 41 (42), § 2 (Liber legis Langobardorum Papiensis Dictum ed. A. Boretio, 
in MGH, Legum t. IV, Hannoverae, 1868, reprinted in 1965) and for more on this topic, 
including a bibliography, see G. Masi, Collectio chartarum pacis privatae medii aevi ad 
regionem Tusciae pertinentium, Milano, 1943, p. 10; P. Brancoli Busdraghi, Aspetti giuridici 
della faida in Italia, in La vengeance 400-1200, D. Barthelemy, F. Bougard, R. Le Jan (ed.), 
Roma, 2006, pp.159-173, especially p. 162. 
36 Inst. 3, 19 (Inutilis stipulatio) § 12. 
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«omni malo sofysmate»37. 
Emperor Henry I would eventually change the mode of proof in the 
event that any peace which had been made through the osculum pacis (still 
a widespread custom in the twelfth century) was breached by murder38. 
The alleged murderer was required to prove his innocence by duel, and if 
he lost, the formulary called for his hand to be cut off as punishment, in 
addition to paying a composition39.  
Lastly, Frederick Barbarossa inflicted severe penalties on delegates of 
the empire who not only failed to administer justice, but who also failed to 
punish any breaches of peace40: 
 
iudices vero et locorum defensores vel quicumque magistratus ab 
imperatore vel eius potestate constituti seu confirmati, qui iustitiam facere 
neglexerint et pacem violatam vindicare legittime supersederint, dampnum 
omne et iniuriam passis resarcire compellantur; et insuper si maior iudex 
est, sacro erario penam X librarum auri preste, minor autem pena trium 
librarum auri multetur. 
 
Such peacemaking practices would remain in use for some time and 
become a characteristic trait of both statutory legislation and the juristic 
concept of justice and public order41. Private parties or city governments42 
 
37 Masi, Collectio (nt. 35), nr. V, Volterra – 1193, October 27, p. 32. 
38 Ibidem, nr. VII, 12 November, p. 39 («pacis hosculo interveniente»); nr. XII, 
Passignano, 1238, March 19, p. 62. 
39 Exp. ad Heinr. I, 3 also covered in Brancoli Busdraghi, Aspetti (nt. 35), pp. 167-168.  
40 MGH, Legum s. IV Constitutiones t. I (nt. 18), nr. 176. Constitutio pacis, 5, p. 246. 
41 A. Padoa Schioppa, Delitto e pace privata now in Id., Italia e Europa nella storia del 
diritto, Bologna, 2009, pp. 290-250; on M. Sbriccoli’s now classic pairing of negotiated 
justice – hegemonic justice, see the collection of essays in Id., Storia del diritto penale e 
della giustizia. Scritti editi e inediti (1972-2007), Milano, 2009 (For the history of modern 
legal thought, 88), especially pp.47-128. 
42 Masi, Collectio (nt. 35), nr. X, Volterra - 1220, May 19: «De pace facienda vel de 
tregua facienda», p. 48; M. Vallerani, Pace e processo nel sistema giudiziario. L’esempio di 
Perugia, in Id., La giustizia pubblica medievale, Bologna, 2005, pp. 167-209; M. Ascheri, La 
pace negli statuti dei comuni toscani: una introduzione, in Iuris Historia. Liber amicorum 
Gerhard Dolezalek, V. Colli, E. Conte (ed.), Berkeley, 2008, pp. 73-87; other bibliographical 
references can be found in nt. 93. 
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continued to make peace – in or out of court – using the terms securitates 
and paces, while the older term finis intentionis was being used less and 
less43. Although jurisdictional authority was being progressively centralized 
in the hands of the public legal system in order that «ne crimina remaneant 
impunita», these forms of ‘negotiated’ justice were widespread, not only in 
Italy but also in Europe. Indeed, it was a social attitude that persisted for 
centuries, so much so that even Emperor Charles V had to address its 
validity in the Duchy of Milan44. 
 
b) Causae publicae: Rebellion (seditio) without the king’s 
authorization. 
Records show that as far back as the reign of Perctarit45, the monarchy 
was intent on containing any scandals or rebellions that may have erupted 
among its subjects because of biased or corrupt judges. Liutprand only 
accentuated this further when he intervened in matters of justice in 721, 
instituting more severe punishments in cases of justice denied (specifically, 
those cases previously addressed by Rothari), in addition to providing 
parties with the opportunity to appeal to the king if they believed that a 
sentence was illegitimate or unjust46. However, allowing subjects to appeal 
directly to the royal court in cases of a denial or miscarriage of justice was 
a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it enabled the king to exercise 
more effective control over judicial authority, but on the other hand, as 
could be expected, it weakened the authority of the king’s delegates in the 
eyes of the subjects. Indeed, in many cases the delegates were already 
 
43 Masi, Collectio (nt. 35), «Breve finitionis et perdonationis et securitatis», Firenze, 
1102 October, 13, p. 20. The term intentio in Liut. 134, also covered in Busdraghi, Aspetti 
(nt. 35), pp. 160-163; see also Concordiae, in MGH Legum, t. IV (nt. 24) tit. II, Capituli 
Rothari et Liutprandi de scandalis, p. 239-240. 
44 Padoa Schioppa, Delitto e pace privata (nt. 41), especially pp. 242-246 
45 For more on this topic, including a bibliography, see Storti, Città e campagna (nt. 
32), pp. 307-308. 
46 Liut. 25 - 27 and see A. Padoa Schioppa, Ricerche sull’appello nel diritto intermedio, I, 
Milano 1965, pp. 153-158; Id., Note sull’appello nel pensiero dei glossatori, now in Id., 
Giustizia medievale italiana (nt. 24), pp. 255-276; some references can also be found in C. 
Storti, Le dimensioni giuridiche (nt. 29), pp. 456-457. 
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dealing with problems in their local jurisdictions because of openly 
expressed dissent or disobedience, above all in recently conquered 
territories or in territories under threat of conquest by neighboring 
governments. 
In 723, this state of affairs led Liutprand to strengthen the hierarchical 
link between the dukes and the king by declaring that an offense against 
the former was equivalent to an offense against the latter. Consequently, 
this increased the number of cases of sedition, which Rothari had 
previously considered a crime only if an attack was against the king or 
against the peace and order of the kingdom47. 
Liutprand used the term seditio48 to describe any uprising that aimed to 
expel a duke (iudex) from a city, unless the rebels had contacted the 
palatium beforehand in order to obtain the king’s authorization for such 
action49. Thus, crimes of sedition against decentralized authorities were 
now considered causae regales, falling under the competence of the 
central court 50 . It did not matter whether a rebellion erupted 
spontaneously or was the result of a ‘conspiracy’, whether it had been 
 
47 Roth. 9. 
48 Isidore of Seville, Etimologie o Origini, A. Valastro Canale (ed.), Torino, 2006, V De 
legibus et temporibus, XXVI De criminibus in lege conscriptis, 11, «seditio dicitur dissensio 
civium», p. 414; V, 24 De instrumentis legalibus, XXXI, «sacramentum est pignus 
sponsionis», p. 406; IX De linguis, gentibus, regnis, militia civibus, affinitatibus, III De regnis 
militiaeque vocabulis, 55 «coniuratio quae fit in tumultu, quando vicinum urbis periculum 
singulos iurare non patitur, sed repente colligitur multitudo et tumultuosa in ira 
conflatur», pp. 749-750.. 
49 Liut. 35. Malum was a premeditated attack that could potentially result in the 
victim’s death. See also Codice Diplomatico Longobardo, C. Troya (ed.), Napoli, 1839, vol. 
III, a. 733 March 1, pp. 583 et seq., especially p. 587: «Pro illicita autem presumpcione de 
ipsa autem colleccione […] Hoc autem idem instituimus ut nullus presumat malas causas in 
qualecumque locum excitare, aud facere, et non potuimus causam ipsam ad arischild*, 
neque wigrigild, neque ad consilium rusticarum, aud ad sediccionem et magis congruum 
paruit nobis esse de consilium malum , idest consilium mortis, quia quando se colligunt et 
super alios vadunt ut malum faciant, aud si casus evenerint, ad (quod) hominem occidant , 
et plagas et feritas faciant. Ideo ut diximus assimilavimus causam istam ad consilium 
mortis, quod sunt sicut supra premisimus sol. viginti» (*the laws against sedition and the 
seditious). 
50 C. Storti, Le dimensioni giuridiche (nt. 29), pp. 450-462. 
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organized in the city where the crime was then committed or in another 
jurisdiction, or whether it was justifiable or not because of a duke’s unjust 
regime: any rebellion against iudices was deemed by Liutprand to be a 
violation of both the peace of God and the king’s peace, which subjects 
were never to jeopardize («in pace et gratia Dei et regis vivere valeant»)51. 
As the main victim of this crime, the publicum was entitled to the 
possessions confiscated from the leader of the uprising («omnes res eius 
ad publicum perveniant»), who was also to be put to death for his crime; 
furthermore, co-conspirators were required to compensate the publicum 
through the payment of the guidrigild. The duke and any other loyal 
subjects who had been personally affected by the rebellion, including 
through injury to their relatives or property (malum), were also entitled to 
compensation: 
 
If an individual in a city organizes a rebellion against his judge without the 
king’s authorization [voluntas], or commits a crime [malum] against said 
judge, or seeks to expel the judge without having received an order from 
the king [iussio], or if, as above, several men [alteri homines] from one city 
have rebelled against another city or have attempted to expel another judge 
without the king’s approval [voluntas], then the leader of the uprising shall 
lose his life and all of his possessions shall become property of the 
publicum; the others who conspired with him [in malo consentientes] shall 
each pay their guidrigild to the palatium. If they have damaged the home of 
someone who is loyal to the palatium or to the king or duke, or if they have 
stolen goods from said home, then they shall pay the octogild to the 
palatium in addition to the guidrigild. That this bad habit may not develop 
further, and on the contrary, that it may be eradicated so that all may live in 
the peace and grace of God and the king. 
 
c) Protests against ‘just’ rulings issued by public authorities 
According to Liut. 34, a rebellion which was authorized or ordered by 
the king was justified. In the wake of Liutprand’s policy, in 746 Ratchis 
extended such justification to include those rebellions which were 
triggered tout court by unjust orders or rulings, or by a denial of justice, 
even if the rebels were led by a person of high dignity. 
 
51 Liut. 34 (35). 
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At the same time, Ratchis expanded the crime of sedition to include any 
crowd of four or more citizens which gathered (adunacio - zava of mali 
homines) to peacefully protest or violently dispute just orders or rulings 
issued by the duke («quae ille ei recte dixerit»). Furthermore, he 
specifically addressed the case of those who refused to appear at trial 
when summoned or subpoenaed because they wanted to seek out other 
judges in whom they had greater confidence («aut ad eius iudicium non 
vadat, confidens in alicuius patrocinio») 52. 
 
We have been informed that in individual cities, groups of four or more mali 
homines gather in order to protest, peacefully or violently, against their 
judge zavas et adunaciones faciunt, declaring that they do not want to obey 
the just orders [recte] of the duke, or refusing to appear in court (confidens 
in alicuius patrocinio) and they seek to incite others. 
 
As mentioned above, the lawfulness of a rebellion was dependent upon 
whether the actions of the authorities could be considered just, and rebels 
were not punished until that was verified. The term recte had already been 
used by Liutprand to evaluate the justness of sentences issued by way of a 
judge’s discretionary power (arbitrium), or when assuming that such 
sentences were within the bounds of the law53. Lothar would use the term 
in the same way in his capitulary of Pavia in 832 (reproduced in the 
expositio54), as would Otto III55. In the text of the council of Paris in 829, 
 
52 Rach. 6, Zava idest rixa, in the gloss in Exp. ad Rachis 6. In the more recent codes «id 
est firmamentum ad bellum», cf. G. Princi Baccini, Restituzione germanica di un tecnicismo 
giuridico longobardo: zava (Rachis 10): Appendice I. Esempi di estrapolazione meccanica 
nei glossatori medievali di testi giuridici longobardi, in Parole longobarde nelle Leges 
Langobardorum e oltre: identificazioni e restauri, A. Princi Baccini, M. C. Picchi (eds.), 
Padova, 2012, pp. 89-122. Cf. also Ead., Termini germanici per il diritto e la giustizia: sulle 
tracce dei significati autentici attraverso etimologie vecchie e nuove, in La giustizia 
nell’alto medioevo (Secoli V-VIII) (nt. 24), pp. 1053-1207. 
53 Liut. 28 (Si quis causam): «[…] Et si forsitans iudex causam per arbitrium iudicaverit, 
et iudicium eius rectum non comparuerit , non sit culpavelis, nisi preveat sacramentum 
regi, quod non iniquo animo aut corruptus a premio, causam ipsam non iudicassit; nisi sic 
ei legem conparuissit, et sit absolutus. Nam si iurare non presumpserit, componat ut supra 
dictum est. […]». 
54 Capitulare Papiense a. 832, in MGH, Legum, s. II, Capitularia regum Francorum, t. II, 
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rectum appears in the declensions iustitiae rectitudo and incorrectum with 
regard to facti qualitas56. The term also took on the latter meaning in 
several placita during the tenth century57. 
Ratchis placed limits on direct appeals to the king, which Liutprand had 
provided for in order that subjects could decry poor governing on the part 
of the local authorities; specifically, now ‘dissenters’ could only appeal 
directly to the palatium for cases of concern to and under the competence 
of the king (causa regis) 58. As there was some uncertainty regarding the 
meaning of such an expression, the expositor adopted a strict 
interpretation thereof (as will be seen below). Indeed, he referred 
exclusively to Rothari’s edict 9, which called for the death penalty to be 
inflicted upon anyone who threatened the safety of the king and the 
state59. 
Furthermore, an appeal could be made to the palatium in order to 
obtain justice if appellants could prove that they had been the victim of a 
 
p. I, Hannoverae, 1890, reprinted in 1986, nr. 201, p. 61, nr. 6, and see F. Bougard, La 
justice dans le royaume d’Italie de la fin du VIIIe siècle au début du XIe siècle, Ecole 
française de Rome, 1995, especially pp. 24-29, 50-51; Prodi, Il sacramento del potere (nt. 
2), pp. 92-94; S. Balossino, Iustitia, lex, consuetudo: per un vocabolario della giustizia nei 
capitolari italici, «Reti medievali», 6 (2005), pp. 1-48, especially p. 3.  
55 Festorum placito rex tertius invidet Otto, in Expositio (nt. 35) p. 581, which the 
expositio notes as contrasting with D 2, 12 (feriis), 1, 3). 
56 Concilium Parisiense 829 mensis Iunii die 6, in MGH, Legum S. III, Concilia, t. II, p. II, 
Hannoverae, 1908 (reprinted in 1979), p. 650 and 652, cf. A. Padoa Schioppa, La giustizia 
ecclesiastica dell’età carolingia: i canoni sinodali, in. Id., Studi sul diritto canonico 
medievale, Spoleto, 2017, pp. 79-126, in part. pp. 99-102. 
57 In some judicial placita of the tenth century, the sentence was introduced by various 
combinations of the following formula: «rectum eorum omnium paruit qui supra iudicibus 
et auditores et iudicaverunt ut iusta eurum altercationes» (Storti, Città e campagna (nt. 
32), especially pp. 304-305 and p. 325 nt. 101). See also Forma notitiae pro securitate, in 
MHG, Legum t. IV (nt. 35), p. 604: «[…] his actis et manifestatione supra facta, rectum 
iisdem iudicibus et auditoribus aperuit esse, et iudicaverunt ut iuxta eorum altercationem 
[…]». 
58 Ibidem: […] «Si vero de causa regis aliquid dicere voluerit, sit ei licentia veniendi ad 
palacium […] suscipiat sententiam secundum qualitatem causae, sicut anterius edictum 
continet». 
59 Exp. ad Rach. 10, §§2-3. 
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crime (violentiae) and had not obtained justice, or had been wrongfully 
convicted of a crime due to the bias or corruption of the duke. This 
included the arimanni, for whom there was a specific procedure in place60. 
If the denial of justice was proved, then the protesters would be acquitted 
of the charge («non computetur in adunatione»), while the duke would 
lose his office (honorem) and be required to pay the guidrigild: half to the 
palatium and half to the injured party. 
 
d) Adunationes, collectae and cospirationes of private individuals and 
holders of public office: Punishment by exile. 
As emperor, king of the Lombards and king of Italy, Lothar I 
concentrated his efforts on political crimes committed by associations of 
citizens, and introduced punishment by exile for cases of non-violent 
organization. 
Three rules against the crime of political conspiracy were attributed to 
Lothar I by the liber papiensis, each of which provides a glimpse of how 
and what kind of associations were formed in the early decades of the 
ninth century. What emerges is that there was a perception of organized 
dissent as being an insidious or dangerous problem for peace in the 
kingdom61. 
The severity of punishment was based on both the extent to which 
 
60 A. Cavanna, Fara sala arimannia nella storia di un vico longobardo, Milano, 1964 and 
on the historiographical debate, see Storti, Le dimensioni giuridiche (nt. 29), pp. 470-473. 
61 G. Bognetti, Milano sotto gli imperatori carolingi, in Storia di Milano (nt. 15), vol. II, 
pp. 363-398; Id., Appendice, ibid., pp. 737-740; E. Hlawitschka, Lotharingien und das Reich 
an der Schwelle der deutschen Geschichte, Stuttgart 1968, pp. 10-16, 19, 29, 36, 73, 85 s., 
101, 110, 129-131, 172, 176 s., 207; P. Delogu, Strutture politiche e ideologia nel Regno di 
Ludovico II, «Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio 
Muratoriano», LXXX (1968), pp. 53-114, especially 137-146, 149-153; V. Fumagalli, Il 
Regno italico, in Storia d'Italia, Torino, 1978, ad ind; G. Tabacco, Sperimentazioni del 
potere nell'Alto Medioevo, Torino, 1993, ad ind.; G. Albertoni, L'Italia carolingia, Roma, 
1997, ad ind.; P. Moro, Venezia e l'Occidente nell'Alto Medioevo. Dal confine longobardo al 
pactum lotariano, in Venezia. Itinerari per la storia della città, S. Gasparri, G. Levi, P. Moro 
(eds.), Bologna 1997, ad ind.; P. Cammarosano, Nobili e re. L'Italia politica dell'Alto 
Medioevo, Roma-Bari 1998, ad ind.; L. Loschiavo, Lotario I, imperatore, re d’Italia, in 
Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, vol. 66 (2006), pp. 171-181. 
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conspirators’ actions had disturbed society as well as on the kind of rituals 
used to form their bond. Certain rituals were specifically cited, such as 
shaking right hands (per dexteram, previously addressed by Isidore62) and 
the swearing of oaths (per sacramentum), and it seems reasonable to think 
that obligationes per wadiam were also included for Lombard subjects, as 
regulated by Roth. 360 and 362, and Liutp. 8 (§ si quidem per wadiam 
obligatio facta fuerit) 63. The innovation here lay in the desire to repress 
the mere act of association, so much so that the very existence of such 
rituals became criminally relevant. This was in keeping with orders 
previously issued by Charlemagne in the Capitulary of Herstal (779), though 
these had actually been in reference to very specific cases. Those orders 
were eventually included in the Lombarda, but not in the Liber papiensis64. 
It was forbidden to assemble in an adunatio (the same term was used in 
Ratchis 6) if its purpose was to protest against the authorities, and any 
violation of this was punished as follows: the organizer («ille qui prius 
ipsum consilium inchoavit») of a ‘peaceful’ association founded upon the 
swearing of an oath or some other form of pledge was to be exiled to 
Corsica; co-conspirators were to pay a fine (bannum) if they were solvent, 
otherwise they were sentenced to flogging. 
Lothar seems to have dealt with these same cases even more severely in 
the Capitulary of Pavia (832). First of all, its prologue reaffirmed the validity 
of previous orders issued by Charlemagne and Louis the Pious65. Lothar 
 
62 Isidore, Etimilogie (nt. 48), XI De homine et portentis, I De homine et partibus eius, 
67: «Dextra vocatur a dando, ipsa enim pignum pacis datur; ipsa fidei testis atque salutis 
adhibetur; et hoc est illud apud Tullium: «Fidem publicam iussu Senatus dedi», id est 
dextram». 
63 E. Cortese, Il diritto nella storia medievale, I, L’alto medioevo, Roma, 1995, pp. 162-
166. 
64 MGH Legum Sectio II, Capitularia Regum Francorum, t. I, Hannoverae 1883, nr. 20 
Capitulare Haristallense, 779 mense martio, 16 De sacramentis per gildonia, p. 51 «De 
sacramentis per gildoniam invicem coniurandis ut nemo facere presumat. Alo vero modo 
de illorum elemosinis aut de incendio aut de naufragio, quamvis convenentias faciant, 
nemo in hoc iurare presumat», in Leges longobardorum cum argutissimis glosis Caroli de 
Tocco, G. Astuti ed., Torino, 1964, (= Lomb.), Lib. I, tit. 17 De aggressione in vico facta et de 
collectionibus, l. 7  
65 Capitulare Papiense a. 832 (nt. 52) in Lomb. (nt. 62), Lib. I, tit. XVII De aggressione in 
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then divided associations formed for political purposes (conspirationes) 
into three different categories of seriousness based on whether the bond 
had been entered into by way of oath or handshake: 
 
ut de cetero in regno nostro nulla huismodi conspiratio fiat nec per 
sacramentum nec sine sacramento 
 
Regardless of the kind of bond that linked conspirators, they were to be 
subjected to corporal punishment if their conspiratorial act had resulted in 
crimes against the person (malum). The perpetrators of the crime 
(auctores facti) were to be sentenced to death, while accomplices 
(adiutores) to flogging. Even when it did not lead to the perpetration of 
crimes, conspirators who had simply agreed to resist or rebel against the 
authorities were to be punished by mutual flagellation and head shaving. In 
this case, freemen who had formed an association by shaking right hands 
would have the possibility of exonerating themselves by swearing, cum 
idoneis iuratoribus, that they were not part of a criminal conspiracy («ut 
hoc per malum non fecissent»). If they were not able to do so, then they 
would have to pay a composition in accordance with national law 
(«secundum legem suam»)66. 
On the contrary, Lothar reserved a special procedure for the royal court 
to deal with assemblies (collectae) against the authorities if 
demonstrations of dissent had been led by exponents of the legitimate 
government itself, that is to say, by holders of public office (praepositi, 
lawyers, sculdasci) or those invested with dignities (Loth. 55). 
Indeed, Lothar ordered that local authorities were to inform him of all 
protests resulting from the negligence of counts. Only in these cases – and 
not in those of dissent led by associations – would the king be able to 
review sentences issued by a count, on the condition that the leader of the 
protest was, as mentioned above, a «praepositus aut advocatus sive 
 
vico facta et de collectionibus, l. 7. The title in the Lombarda dealt with the edicts of 
Rothari and Liutprand on attacks in vico, as well as the collectae formed by servants to 
Louis the Pious, Charlemagne’s capitulary cited in nt. 64, and the three laws of Lothar: 
Volumus de obligationibus (4), Collectam ad malum (55) and De conspirationibus (67). 
66 Loth. 67 De conspirationibus  
CLAUDIA STORTI 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 2 (2017), n. 01, pag. 1-31.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 21 
sculdhais vel qualibet alia dignitate praedicta libera persona». As duly 
reaffirmed by the expositio centuries later, upon review the king could 
then suspend any sentence of exile or death that was issued by a local 
court against a public official who had led a protest67. The latter official was 
expected to appear before the palatium (Loth. 55) in the company of 
sureties, where the king, assisted by his curia (cum fidelibus nostris), would 
issue the definitive sentence according to his own assessment of the actual 
case («quid faciendum sit») 68 . The same procedure was used for 
‘professional’ rebels (Loth. 54)69. 
 
3. The interpretation of rules on rebellions and political associations in 
the expositio and glossae to the Liber papiensis (11th-12th 
centuries). 
At some point during or towards the end of the eleventh century, with 
additions seen until 1137-113870, judges and teachers reread the written 
codes which were still in force and interpreted them through glosses and 
the expositio. Naturally, they did so based on their contemporary 
experience, taking into account the events and social situation of the time, 
as well as the political clashes taking place in their cities. Thus, these texts 
were adapted – perhaps even mistakenly – to cases that had not previously 
 
67 Exp. ad Loth. 55 Volumus. 
68 Loth. 55 Volumus.  
69 Loth. 54: «De his qui discordiis et contentionibus studere solent et in pace vivere 
nolunt et inde convicti fuerint similiter volumus, ut per fideiussores ad nostros palatium 
veniant, et ibi cum fidelibus nostris consideremus, quid de talibus hominibus faciendum 
sit». 
70 As described by Boretius (MGH, Legum t. IV (nt. 35), pp. LIII-LXII), the Codex 
Parisiensis (ivi § 16, pp. LVIII-LIX), which formerly belonged to the Church of Saint 
Euphemia in Verona and is marked as nr. 7, contains writings which most recently date to 
1137-1138; the Codex Vindobonensis, marked as nr. 8, dates back to the same manuscript 
from the eleventh century (ivi § 17, p. LX); the Codex Londinensis (once held in the library 
of a Venetian bibliophile until 1780) dates back to 1030 and is marked as nr. 4; lastly, the 
extensively glossed code belonging to the Laurentian Library in Florence (marked as nr. 5) 
dates back to the end of the eleventh century. On the other hand, the Este code, marked 
as nr. 9, is an ‘accurate’, late-fifteenth-century copy made by Pellegrino Prisciani of a code 
which, according to Boretius, dates back to the eleventh century (ivi pp. LX-LXI). 
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been accounted for, or cases which had simply not been written down by 
lawmakers. 
As far as the method of interpretation was concerned, there is no doubt 
that ‘systematic’ criteria and distinctiones were used to examine such a 
vast collection of texts belonging to different systems and eras. The judges 
and teachers were clearly intent on maintaining the validity of all rules 
regarding acts of rebellion or protest, whether carried out by individuals or 
associations71. Each rule was analyzed as it related to the entire system of 
laws governing this matter – a system which had originated with Rothari, 
and which established that the king was to have the final say over matters 
concerning general peace and order72. According to the formulary, any 
legal action against those responsible for any form of rebellion, whether 
individual or by association, was always undertaken by the public 
prosecutor (actor publicus), which was the typical procedure of causae 
regales. 
As for the legal language used in the eleventh century, it goes without 
saying that the iudex of the Lombards was always changed to comes in the 
formulary and in the expositio. Furthermore, in keeping with Liutprand’s 
edict 34, the organizer of a rebellion was still considered to bear greater 
responsibility than that of mere followers. 
Another evident tendency was that of equating cases which had 
previously gone under different names in the edicts and capitularies. 
Specifically, the terms seditio in Liutprand and adunatio in Ratchis were 
now considered synonymous: indeed, the expositio maintained that the 
latter’s rule strengthened the former’s in helping suppress rebellions 
against the comes73. The Lombarda also brought the two rules together 
under the same title (De seditione)74. 
On the other hand, both the expositio and the glosses reaffirmed the 
clear distinction between a spontaneous act of rebellion and a 
 
71 For example, see Exp. ad Loth. 4 (Volumus), § 2, which also includes references to 
Loth. 67 (De conspirationisbus). 
72 Roth. 9. 
73 Exp. ad Liutp. 34, § 2. 
74 Lomb. Lib.I, tit. 18 De seditione contra iudicem vel civitatem levata. 
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‘conspiratorial’ one, the latter referring to a revolt against the authorities 
which had been organized by forming an association of rebels. This was 
also reaffirmed by the Lombarda under the title De aggressione in vico 
facta et de collectionibus75. 
 
a) Negligence on the part of the authorities: Strict interpretation of 
justification for rebellion 
Nonetheless, what followed was a strong clash of opinions which 
seemed to hint at an intense political debate. The biggest doubt concerned 
the justification of a reaction triggered by injustice or negligence on the 
part of public authority: while Ratchis (6) permitted it for adunationes and 
Lothar (55) for collectae, the question was whether such justification 
applied to cases in which a reaction was not spontaneous, but rather 
plotted by one of the associations punished by Lothar 4 and 67, or 
organized by a holder of public office or person of high dignity.  
Based on the text and glosses in Boretius’ edition (pending a direct 
examination of the manuscripts), it seems that there were two main 
interpretations of this issue in the political debate and jurisdiction of the 
time: one of an extensive nature, and the other of an opposite, restrictive 
nature. 
The dominant interpretation that appeared in the expositio and in the 
glosses excluded such justification for revolts organized by political 
associations. 
Indeed, the interpreters believed that the exceptions set forth by Lothar 
in Collectam were only applicable to ‘informal’, sudden rebellions which 
broke out spontaneously and without premeditation, and not to 
‘conspiracies’ organized by formal associations, which Lothar had already 
deemed illegal (Loth. 4 and 67) 76. According to this interpretation, Lothar’s 
chapter 4 was understood to exclude the possibility of dropping charges 
against rebels united by association, even if there was proof of an unjust 
act leading to their rebellion. 
In the expositio to Ratchis 6, the judges and teachers, having analyzed 
 
75 Lomb. Lib. I, tit. 17. 
76 Exp. ad Liutp. 34, §2.  
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the ratio of the various rules collected in the Liber papiensis, concluded 
that they did not apply to rebellions against the established authorities 
when led by formally organized groups. The interpreters also addressed 
the fact that the king had justified rebellions which were triggered by 
unjust orders or rulings, or by a denial of justice, even if the rebels were led 
by a person of high dignity. This rule appeared to have been implemented 
in Lothar 55, wherein it was stated that the king would personally evaluate 
the responsibility of the rebellion’s leader77. Once again, however, the rule 
was interpreted as only applying to the case of spontaneous collective 
action, and not in those cases where action had been taken by 
organizations of formally bound conspirators (punished under Loth. 4 and 
67). 
The fact that this issue was the subject of debate is also evidenced by 
additions to the edict in several manuscripts. Indeed, while Ratchis’ text in 
the Parisian, Viennese and Este codes78 read «Sed ita statuimus, ut si 
amodo quicumque homo», the words «privatus a publica dignitate» were 
added from Lothar 55 (themselves glossed in the margin of manuscript nr. 
4). This was done in order to clarify even further that with quicumque 
homo, Ratchis had not intended to deal with rebellions led by holders of 
public office – a case which, on the contrary, was addressed by Loth. 55. 
Moreover, the same manuscripts feature an addition to the text in 
Ratchis 6, whereby the rule was deemed inapplicable to cospirationes that 
had been organized by way of obligationes, sacramentum or dextera in 
accordance with Loth. 4: 
 
componat sicut anterius edictum de seditione contra iudicem suum levata 
[Liut. 34] continere videtur. Si haec non per obligationem fuerit, non per 
sacramentum neque per dextram per capitulis Lotharii “Volumus” [5] “De 
conspirationibus” [67] 
 
The expositio supported this solution as well, while preserving the 
procedure whereby decisions on collectae led by a person of high dignity 
 
77 Exp. § 3 ad Liutp. 34. 
78 See nt. 70 above. 
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were to be referred to the king (Loth. 55). Nonetheless, the latter 
procedure was only available to those who had not organized the collectae 
as a union of formally bound members (through «sacramento neque 
dextra aut obligatione») – a specification that was missing from the text 
that shall be examined in the next paragraph79. 
As previously mentioned, Ratchis had permitted direct appeal to the 
palatium: «si vero de causa regis aliquid dicere voluerit». However, the 
term causa regis lacked any clarification, which probably led to an intense 
debate on what kind of cases could be considered of concern to the king. 
That would seem to explain why an explicit reference to Roth. 9 was added 
to the text: «causa regis quae est posita in initio nostri antecessoris 
Rotharis»80. In this way, it was reaffirmed that if someone were to present 
the royal court with unfounded or groundless accusations of attacks on the 
king or on peace in the kingdom, or falsely accuse someone of treason in 
favor of foreign enemies 81, then that person would face the same 
punishment set forth in the capitulary. Such a strict interpretation thus 
determined that this edict was only to apply to the aforementioned cases, 
and not, as some contended, to any causa regis82.  
Lastly, the expositio to Lothar’s De conspirationibus stated that the 
auctores (those who were in capite) and the adiutores (those who were 
cum eo) 83 of associations that had been formed by taking a pledge or oath 
were not to be subjected to punishments set forth in other sources, such 
as previous edicts or the quisquis fragment of the lex Iulia maiestatis84. 
 
79 Exp. ad Rach. 6 § 2. 
80 In the text of codes 7-9, in the margin of code 4. 
81 Ibidem, § 3-6. Rothari had not specified which accusations were being referred to in 
his rule. On the other hand, both the formularium and the expositio to Roth. 9 identified 
the following: attacking the emperor or king; fleeing the kingdom; aiding or abetting 
enemies to enter the kingdom’s territory; aiding or hiding enemy spies; rebelling against 
the duke during acts of war or against a delegate of the king during military expeditions; 
or lastly, leaving a comrade-in-arms in the hands of the enemy or refusing to try to free a 
captured comrade. 
82 Exp. ad Rach. 6 § 4. 
83 Formularium ad Loth. 67. 
84 This meant excluding the enforceability of «Romanorum leges de adunatione 
loquentes» in Exp. ad Loth 67 (De conspirationibus). The reference was to a constitution of 
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b) Negligence on the part of the authorities: Extending justification to 
sworn unions 
While judges had interpreted Ratchis 685 as justifying rebellions only 
when they were spontaneous expressions of dissent triggered by ‘bad 
governance’, negligence, or injustice on the part of local authorities, some 
jurists disagreed. They believed that justification in such cases was to be 
extended to protests organized by sworn unions and led by a member of 
the public authorities. It seems reasonable to presume that this was also 
requested by those charged with conspiracy, together with their lawyers86. 
In addition, these jurists disagreed with the punishment of mandatory 
exile, stating that any such decision was to be left to the king’s discretion: 
 
capitulum hoc (Loth. 4) a subsequenti Lotharii capitulo quod est ‘collectam 
ad malum faciendum’ (Loth. 55) in parte rumpitur, quia si haec adunatio per 
negligentiam comitis evenerit vel inemendata remanserit, et auctor facti si 
fuerit prepositus aut advocatus sive sculdais vel qualibet dignitate preditus, 
post legalem emendationem in loco factam sub fideiussoribus in presentiam 
regis invitetur et non in Corsicam, nisi regi placuerit87 
 
This interpretation was reaffirmed in the expositio to Lothar 55 
(Collectam) 88, but there is no doubt that it was met with strong objection, 
evidenced by the fact the very same text also considered the opposite 
opinion: namely, that the king was not entitled to use his discretion in 
 
Arcadius and Honorius which inflicted the death penalty («gladio feriatur») upon anyone 
who, united in a factio, swore an oath (sacramenta) to kill members of the imperial court, 
in C. Theod. 9, 14,3 and in C. 9,8,5 Ad legem iuliam maiestatis, l. quisquis). On the 
emergence of Roman criminal law in the twelfth century, see G. Minnucci, Tractatus 
criminum saeculi XII editionem criticam congessit, Bologna, 1997. 
85 See nt. 79. 
86 Exp. ad Loth. 4 (Volumus), Form.: «Petre te appellat Martinus, qui est advocatus de 
parte publica, quod tu fecisti adunationem per obligationem, et fuisti in capite»  
87 Exp. ad Loth 4 (Volumus), § 3 
88 Exp. ad Loth 55 (Collectam) «Capitulum hoc […] dicens vero “si adunatio facta fuerit 
per neglegentiam comitis vel inemendata remanserit et auctor facti qualibet dignitate 
preditus fuerit in nostram presentiam veniat” predictum capitulum eademque leges 
rumpit, quia nec in Corsica mittetur nec mortuus est, donec ad regis conspectum veniat». 
CLAUDIA STORTI 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Italian Review of Legal History, 2 (2017), n. 01, pag. 1-31.  
Registrazione presso il Tribunale di Milano n. 227/2015 
Contatti: via Festa del Perdono 7 - 20122 Milano - segreteria@irlh.unimi.it 27 
deciding on such cases, but rather was obliged to uphold the letter of the 
law89. 
It is impossible to determine whether such cases were frequent or 
isolated. The fact remains that a gloss on Lothar 67 (Conspirationibus) – a 
chapter which dealt with the punishments to be inflicted on associations 
formed by way of oath or handshake – specified the consequences of 
establishing any kind of association based on the way the criminal bond 
had been formed: 
 
aliud iuditium est in conspiratione facta per obligationem, aliud in 
obligatione per sacramentum aliud in obligatione per dexteram facta  
 
There was no questioning that the leader of a peaceful association 
formed by way of oath was to be punished by exile, and that his 
accomplices were to pay a fine; and that the same fine was to be paid by 
freemen who had formed an association by shaking right hands. Thus, as 
far as sworn unions were concerned, the true distinction lay between 
those which had committed crimes and those which had not. In the former 
case, it remained undisputed that the leaders would be sentenced to death 
and the accomplices to mutual flagellation. However, the gloss does not 
seem to have provided for the infliction of such punishment in the event 
that no crime had been plotted or committed (a case which, on the 
contrary, Lothar had dealt with). 
This interpretation seems to have been reaffirmed by another gloss on 
Lothar’s De conspirationibus in a later collection by Carolus de Tocco, 
according to which punishments were inflicted only upon those 
associations that were intent on committing crimes: «secus si ad 
bonum»90. 
Thus, is it possible to conclude that jurists and judges saw peaceful, 
sworn associations as becoming acceptable to the authorities if they did 
 
89 Exp. ad Loth 4 (Volumus), § 3: «Sed, ut quidam dicunt, res convenientius non poterit 
eum iudicare, quam cum pena per predictam legem sibi imposita, id est quam si eum in 
Corsicam miserit, ut hic precipitur».  
90 Carolus de Tocco (nt. 64) Lomb., lib. I, tit. 17 De aggressione, l. 9 De conspirationibus, 
gl. a quamcumque: «scilicet ad malum faciendum, secus si ad bonum». 
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not commit crimes against the person? Is it reasonable to think that public 
authority no longer perceived the existence of a sworn association as a 
threat to the common peace? 
In reality, without additional records to examine, it is not possible for a 
historian to answer these questions. 
Over the course of the eleventh century, the jurisprudence coming out 
of the school of Pavia provided evidence of how political dissent against 
the legitimate authorities was contained and suppressed by the kingdom 
and empire. However, the probative force of this evidence cannot extend 
beyond that specific time period: namely, no later than the end of the 
eleventh century at most. It is impossible to know with certainty what 
happened in the first decades of the twelfth century with regard to 
peaceful or violent protests, as many Italian cities were beginning to fall 
under the control of sworn associations or groups of citizens led by holders 
of public office or persons of high dignity. 
In short, Italian records and chronicles have not yet provided enough 
information on the transformation of individual cities to draw any 
conclusions on the actual organization of rebel groups, nor can it be 
determined what procedure the courts may have followed, or if they 
indeed had any procedure in place at all. First and foremost, the 
handwritten glosses to the Liber papiensis and the Lombarda will have to 
be re-examined: a long process to be sure, but one which is clearly 
necessary. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Whether private individuals or holders of public office, citizens 
organized groups to express their dissent and petition for change against 
the political authority. Indeed, for centuries, their methods of association 
had been the target of government regulation during the various rulerships 
of the Kingdom of Italy. 
Any expression of dissent against public authority was to come before 
the royal court for judgement, and this centralization of power may have 
given rise to a constant, ‘defensive’ jurisprudence on the matter which 
continued even after the palatium was burnt down. It is likely, then, that 
those who disagreed with such an interpretation of the law forged ahead 
with their counterarguments: after all, the old laws had viewed a 
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spontaneous, immediate protest against the unjust acts of the authorities 
as the exercise of a right of resistance, to use a modern expression. Indeed, 
it seems that a political debate on this issue was unfolding in the eleventh 
century, with effects spilling over to the courts as well. 
Though experts in the field (advisors, judges, scholars, lawyers, public 
officials, members of the city elite) were quite familiar with the law on 
associations, a number of clashes involving cities, the kingdom and the 
empire led Frederick Barbarossa to simplify the law with his Hac edictali 
constitution of 1158. This reduced political associations to only two 
categories (conventiculae, coniurationes): those that obeyed the empire, 
and those that opposed the empire’s ‘intrusions’ into their affairs. 
Barbarossa classified the latter as internal enemies, without distinguishing 
whether such groups were associations of cities, associations of individuals 
and cities, or associations of individuals91. Once again, just as Liutprand and 
his successors had done, those in power claimed to be safeguarding peace 
by fighting against political opposition; and once again, the political 
opposition justified their actions by pointing to the injustices which had 
been committed and/or which had not been remedied by the emperor’s 
delegates. 
Meanwhile, after centuries of practice, private peacemaking had 
become firmly entrenched in the legal systems of the cities that would 
eventually become communes. Peace was safeguarded mainly through 
‘forced’ peacemaking deals or by reaching private agreements with the 
support of the authorities, thanks in part to the many forms of arbitration 
that were available. This was especially the case in the beginning, when 
parties would resort to arbitration so as to avoid the uncertainties 
surrounding the legitimacy of city judges and the validity erga omnes of 
 
91 MGH, Legum s. IV Constitutiones (nt. 18), nr. 176. Constitutio pacis, Hac edictali, nr. 
6, p. 246. Together with Frederick’s De pace tenenda and Lothar III’s Imperialis 
benevolentiae, the Haec edictali was inserted in the Consuetudines feudorum, which was a 
‘public law’ text that was only put in writing in the twelfth century. This text was in force 
in imperial courts, alongside Lombard, Frankish and Italian law (more information can be 
found in my encyclopedia entry: I giuristi di fronte alla città e all’Impero, in Enciclopedia 
italiana. Il contributo italiano alla storia del pensiero. Ottava appendice. Diritto, Roma, 
Fondazione Treccani, 2012, pp. 15-21, especially p. 19.  
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their sentences. Equally entrenched was punishment by exile, which then 
became banishment. 
The cities themselves were dealing with factional conflicts of their own, 
with the winners doing the same thing to the losers that Barbarossa had 
done to enemy cities in his empire. The justification of insurrection on the 
basis of injustices or negligence was no longer an option; as seen quite 
clearly in the glossators’ interpretations, the approach now was not only to 
expel dissidents, but also to classify defeated political opponents as an 
enemy in the Roman law sense, with all of the consequences that that 
implied in terms of loss of freedom and confiscation of property92. 
After the cities secured their autonomy with the Peace of Constance 
and became communes, their internal conflicts continued to be led by 
political associations, which went by the Roman law term of factions. Each 
faction fought to defend its own concept of publica utilitas, with its own 
way of managing it and achieving it. At the end of the twelfth century, after 
Milan had defeated and then reconciled with Barbarossa, the political 
tension in the city led the Milanese to divide into two «populi distincti et 
contrarii». It was almost as if the city had divided itself into two distinctly 
organized ‘comuni’, each with its own consuls, podestà, and judges: 
 
et hoc manifeste colligitur quod quam cito cepit vacare imperium, et civitas 
habere cepit pacem quod tam cito civitas fuit divisa in diversas voluntates et 
prelia civilia inchoata fuerunt et tantum crevit, quod in una civitate fuerunt 
duo populi distincti et contrarii, ut si una pars exibat ad pugnam, alia pars 
stabat in domo, expectans suorum civium ruinas audire cum gaudio93. 
 
92 D. 49. 15. 24 e D. 50. 16. 118. A. Padoa Schioppa, Profili del diritto internazionale 
nell’alto medioevo, in Le relazioni internazionali nell’alto medioevo, Spoleto 2011 
(Settimane, C.I.S.A.M., 58), pp. 1-78, especially pp. 11-12 and C. Storti, Early Italian 
Scholars of ius gentium (in press). 
93 The references are to the year 1197. G. Fiamma, Chronicon maius in Id., Chronicon 
extravagans et chronicon maius, ed. A. Ceruti [Milano (1868)], p. 746. For more 
information and a bibliography, see C. Storti, Politica e diritto nel Liber consuetudinum 
Mediolani del 1216. Lo spazio giuridico dei Milanesi, «Archivio Storico Lombardo», s. XII, 
XXI(2016), pp. 147-169, especially pp. 151-153. See also A. Ascheri, Al governo della città-
Stato nel Medioevo italiano: selezione e controllo del ceto politico (2003), now in Id., 
Giuristi medievali e moderni, Stockstadt, 2009, pp.151-170. 
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However, in this Milan, as in other communes, the coexistence of 
opposing political groups degenerated into violent forms of internal 
struggles. Once again, those exposed as organizers of dissent were 
banished (what used to be exile in Corsica under Lothar) and had their 
property confiscated, only this time they were often punished after a 
defeat on the battlefield94. And once again, it became illegal to take an 
oath of solidarity and loyalty if its purpose was to form an association that 
could peacefully protest against the unjust acts of public authority. Indeed, 
any public expression of dissent was no longer allowed. In other words, the 
very same forms of association which had given rise to this system of 
government – the commune – were now being banned by the commune 
itself. It would not take long for this suppression of political dissent to give 
way to a new, self-referential concept of public power. 
 
94 There has been a long and contested historiographical debate on the origins of 
banishment or exile in the communal period, an account of which can be found in G. 
Milani, L’esclusione dal Comune. Conflitti e bandi politici a Bologna e in altre città italiane 
tra XII e XIV secolo, Roma, 2003 (Studi Storici 63), especially pp. 27-35; Id., Banditi, 
malesardi e ribelli. L’evoluzione del nemico pubblico nell’Italia comunale (secoli XII-XIV), in I 
diritti dei nemici «QF» (2009), pp. 109-140, especially pp. 109-111 and P. Costa, Figure del 
Nemico. Strategie di disconoscimento nella cultura politico-giuridica medievale, «Rivista 
Internazionale di Diritto Comune», 27(2007), pp. 141-166, especially pp. 145 et seq.; Id., 
Pagina introduttiva. I diritti dei nemici: un ossimoro? in I diritti dei nemici (nt. 93), pp. 1-40; 
cf. also L. Scuccimarra, Combattere con le parole. Note sulla semantica della guerra civile 
nella prima età moderna, in «Giornale di Storia costituzionale» 26 (2013), pp. 45-63, in 
part. pp. 45-46; A. A. Cassi, Il segno di Caino e i ‘figliuoli di Bruto’. I banditi nella (dalla) 
civitas dell’Italia comunale e signorile tra prassi statutaria e scientia juris, in Ai margini 
della civitas. Figure giuridiche dell'altro tra medioevo e futuro, A. A. Cassi (ed.), Soveria 
Mannelli, 2013, pp. 79-104; A. Zorzi, La questione della tirannide nell’Italia del Trecento, in 
Tiranni e tirannide nel Trecento italiano, A Zorzi (ed.), pp. 11-36, especially pp. 15-19. 
Lastly, see C. Zendri, Banniti nostri temporis. Studi su bando e consuetudine nel diritto 
comune, Napoli, ESI, 2016. 
